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National Archives and 
International Conflicts: The 
Society of American Archivists 
and War
Douglas Cox
A b s t r a c t
The prominent role of the SAA in the recent controversy over the fate of Iraqi records and 
archives highlights crucial questions about the tension between national and international 
interests in archives and the role of archives and archivists during armed conflict. This article 
seeks to frame these questions and fill gaps in the debate within the archival community 
about wartime preservation, controversies over the postwar return of archives, and the role 
of archivists in war. Archivists will undoubtedly face such issues, which have never been more 
complex or more relevant, again in the future; this article seeks to promote renewed, vigorous, 
and respectful debate.
As U.S. forces approached Baghdad in April 2003, Iraqi government offi-cials reportedly ordered the staff of the Iraqi National Archives to destroy  archival materials of the Ba’ath regime to prevent them from falling 
into the hands of the invading forces.1 The destruction order confronted the 
archival staff with a dilemma that illustrates, in its most extreme form, the ten-
sion between international and national interests in archives and records. 
From an international viewpoint, a refusal to destroy such records might 
have been a heroic act that attempted, at great personal risk, to protect the 
integrity of the historical, cultural, and administrative record of Iraq for both 
Iraqi citizens and the world and to preserve potential evidence of human rights 
abuses. Alternatively, from a national viewpoint, a refusal to destroy records of 
1  Nabil Al-Tikriti, “‘Stuff Happens’: A Brief Overview of the 2003 Destruction of Iraqi Manuscript 
Collections, Archives, and Libraries,” Library Trends 55 (2007): 732–33.
© Douglas Cox.
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potential use to an advancing enemy might have been an unethical, and perhaps 
even an illegal or treasonous, act that undermined the “inalienable” legal 
authority of the Iraqi government over its own records, endangered the national 
security of a sovereign nation in a time of war, and risked subsequent exposure 
of confidential information about Iraqi citizens by invading forces. 
In the end, the staff did not execute the order. This brave decision, how-
ever, was quickly robbed of its effect when other individuals, reportedly associ-
ated with the Ba’ath Party, entered the Iraqi National Archives and destroyed 
the records, which included “the history of the Ba’ath Party since it seized power 
in 1963,” during the chaos that followed the fall of Baghdad.2 
The response of the Society of American Archivists (SAA) to the fate of 
records and archives in Iraq was quick and decisive. In its “Statement on Iraqi 
Archives” in April 2003, the SAA cited reports of “deliberate attempts to destroy 
the records of oppression in order to hide evidence of past crimes” and stressed 
the international value of such records. The SAA urged that “archives relating 
to the Iraqi state, its security forces, the daily operation of the government, and 
the history of the nation” should be preserved in “secure custody” on the basis 
that “[w]e all share Iraq’s culture and history” and that the “loss of this heritage 
would not only hurt the Iraqi people; it would also make it harder for Americans 
to understand our culture and values.” “Without records,” the statement contin-
ued, “the Iraqi people as well as the citizens of the world lose an important part 
of our shared cultural heritage.”3
While the Iraqi National Archives smoldered, U.S. forces and private indi-
viduals and organizations seized other Iraqi government records and archives 
throughout the country. In the end, some forty-eight thousand boxes of Iraqi 
records ended up in a U.S. military warehouse in Qatar, and another seven mil-
lion records went to the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. The SAA’s 
response to the fate of these Iraqi records, reflected in a joint statement with the 
Association of Canadian Archivists (ACA) in 2008, stressed national rights and 
national ownership over government archives. The SAA called on the United 
States “to return to the lawfully established government of Iraq—with all delib-
erate speed—Iraqi records now in its possession.” The SAA argued that for 
seized Iraqi records, “the archival principle of inalienability requires that they 
be returned to the national government of Iraq for preservation in the national 
archives.”4
While both SAA statements appear to enjoy widespread acceptance and 
support within the archival community, the statements do not necessarily 
2  Saad Eskander, “The Tale of Iraq’s ‘Cemetery of Books,’” Information Today (December 2004): 1, 50.
3  Society of American Archivists, “Statement on Iraqi Archives,” April 2003.
4  Society of American Archivists and Association of Canadian Archivists, “SAA/ACA Joint Statement on 
Iraqi Records,” 22 April 2008.
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complement one another. They arguably reflect the same tension that confronted 
the staff of the Iraqi National Archives between pursuing international goals of 
maximum protection for archives to maximize future access and respecting 
national rights of ownership. 
The controversies surrounding the Iraqi records are just the newest chap-
ter in the long and troubled history of archives in war. Historically, SAA mem-
bers and officers have made unique and significant contributions to the debate. 
And past articles in this journal—from Ernst Posner’s discussion of the effects 
of changes of sovereignty on the status of archives in volume 5, to Philip P. 
Brower’s review of the history of U.S. seizure and administration of “enemy 
records” prior to World War II in volume 26, to Charles Kecskemeti’s piece on 
a post–World War II settlement for “displaced European archives” in volume 55, 
to Michelle Caswell’s powerful argument for the return of Ba’ath Party records 
earlier this year—provide rich details of the history of such controversies.5 
Archivists will undoubtedly continue to face these issues in the future. This 
article therefore seeks both to encourage and provoke renewed debate within 
the SAA and the archival community more generally about the proper balancing 
of competing interests in national archives in war and peace. It frames the issues 
by exploring the legal and practical complexities of wartime preservation, the 
controversial debates over the postwar return of archives, and the conflicted role 
of the archivist. In particular, this article seeks to challenge assumptions within 
the archival community that international law or “archival inalienability” neces-
sarily compels or prohibits certain results to encourage debate on more flexible 
strategies for balancing national and international interests. The treatment of 
such broad topics here must be brief, but discussing them together is necessary 
to view these related issues in context rather than in distorted isolation.
A r c h i v a l  I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m  a n d  N a t i o n a l i s m
The archival literature and larger international debates over cultural prop-
erty both reflect the conflict between international and national interests in 
archives. A compelling case for internationalism is found in Solon Buck’s 1946 
address, made while he was both Archivist of the United States and president of 
the SAA, entitled “The Archivist’s ‘One World.’ ” “Scholarship that feeds upon 
the archival resources of a single country,” Buck argued, “cannot be otherwise 
than one-sided and nationalistic. The only antidotes are freedom of access to 
5  Ernst Posner, “Effects of Changes of Sovereignty on Archives,” American Archivist 5 (1942): 141–55; 
Philip P. Brower, “The U.S. Army’s Seizure and Administration of Enemy Records up to World War II,” 
American Archivist 26 (1963): 191–207; Charles Kecskemeti, “Displaced European Archives: Is It Time 
for a Post-War Settlement?,” American Archivist 55 (1992): 132–40; Michelle Caswell, “ ‘Thank You Very 
Much, Now Give Them Back’: Cultural Property and the Fight over the Iraqi Baath Party Records,” 
American Archivist 74 (Spring/Summer 2011): 211–40.
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the originals in whatever country they may happen to be and the making and 
exchange of photographic facsimiles.” The international value of national 
archives, Buck further noted, necessitates within each country “the preservation 
and efficient administration of the separate parts that compose the archival 
whole” because the “loss of an important body of records in any country is a loss 
to all countries.”6 
Buck’s advocacy finds a parallel in the concept, familiar in broader debates 
over cultural property, of “cultural internationalism,” which views collections of 
cultural property as part of “common human culture, whatever their places of 
origin or present location, independent of property rights or national 
jurisdiction.”7 The concept finds its most famous expression in the 1954 Hague 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, which expressly extends protections to “archives” and declares in its 
preamble that “damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatso-
ever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind.”8 The SAA echoes 
the same sentiment in its 2003 statement on Iraqi archives, as well as in its 1999 
resolution on the destruction of archives in the former Yugoslavia, which states 
that “the loss of archives anywhere in the world is an irreplaceable tragedy for 
all mankind” and warns that “[o]nce destroyed, archives cannot be re-created, 
and the cultural patrimony of the world is permanently diminished.”9
Cultural internationalism contrasts sharply with “cultural nationalism,” 
which focuses on cultural property as inalienable national property that is part 
of a specific nation’s cultural heritage. This concept is exemplified by the 1970 
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, which also 
extends protections to “archives” but focuses primarily on peacetime export 
and import restrictions on cultural property.10 Cultural nationalism drives the 
growing and highly charged “demands for the ‘repatriation’ of cultural 
property.”11 
What might be called “archival nationalism” is most easily recognizable in 
the often-fierce debates over the return of records and archives seized during 
6   Solon J. Buck, “The Archivist’s ‘One World,’” American Archivist 10 (1947): 17.
7   John Henry Merryman, “Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property,” American Journal of International 
Law 80 (1986): 831–53.
8   The Hague, Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 
Preamble, 14 May 1954, UNESCO, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13637&URL_
DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html, accessed 30 June 2011. 
9   Society of American Archivists, “Resolution on the Systematic Destruction of Archives in Kosovo and 
War-Caused Devastation of Archives throughout Yugoslavia,” 14 April 1999.
10  Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property, 14 November 1970, UNESCO, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13039&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html, accessed 30 June 2011. 
11  Merryman, “Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property,” 832. 
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war and the concept of “archival inalienability.” The decades-long controversy 
over the return of archives from Smolensk, Russia, which the United States 
obtained at the end of World War II and ultimately returned to Russia in 2002, 
provides a well-documented example.12 Similarly, resolutions of the International 
Council on Archives assert the “inalienability and imprescriptibility” of public 
records as state property and invoke a historical international practice that 
“archives captured and displaced during hostilities were returned once peace 
was concluded.”13 The 2008 joint SAA/ACA statement urging that records seized 
in Iraq “be returned to the national government of Iraq for preservation in the 
national archives” expressly relies upon a similar assertion of the “inalienable 
character of national records.” 
The internationalist emphasis on preservation and access and the national-
ist focus on national rights over archives do not always operate at cross- 
purposes.14 Whether in conflict or aligned, however, the distinction is a useful 
one in clarifying the unique complexities inherent in the role of national 
archives and archivists in war. 
A r c h i v e s  a t  W a r
The issue of archives in war is often approached on the assumption that 
archives should be immune from attack or seizure and that international law 
should provide to archives the same protection it extends to works of art, muse-
ums, and other cultural property. For some archives, such as those of an exclu-
sively cultural or historical nature, such assumptions may be accurate. For these 
archives, international and national interests in their preservation are theoreti-
cally aligned and efforts to protect them from bombardment and the dangers 
of combat, while not always effective, ought to be largely uncontroversial.
For national and governmental archives, however, the situation is far more 
complex as international goals of protection and access may directly conflict 
with the competing national security interests of the combatants. The crucial 
characteristic of such archives in war is that, although they may properly be 
considered a form of cultural property, they are not necessarily purely so. As 
12  See Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, The Odyssey of the Smolensk Archive: Plundered Communist Records for the 
Service of Anti-Communism (Pittsburgh, Penn.: Center for Russian and East European Studies, 1995). 
13  “The View of the Archival Community on the Settling of Disputed Claims,” position paper adopted by 
the executive committee of the International Council on Archives at its meeting in Guangzhou, China, 
10–13 April 1995. Similarly, UNESCO has stated “public archives constitute the inalienable and inde-
feasible property of the national community which is represented by the State.” UNESCO, Consultation 
Group to Prepare a Report on the Possibility of Transferring Documents from Archives Constituted 
within the Territory of Other Countries, Final Report (April 1976), CC.76/WS/9: § 5.2.
14  As Michelle Caswell persuasively warns, the distinction should not be used to oversimplify the com-
plexities of individual situations and there are other ways in which these issues can be viewed and 
approached. Caswell, “ ‘Thank You Very Much, Now Give Them Back,’”   237–40. 
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former SAA president and former acting archivist of the United States Trudy 
Huskamp Peterson notes, “archives are both cultural and administrative prop-
erty and fit somewhat awkwardly into a purely cultural definition.”15 Unlike a 
collection of paintings in an art museum, combatants cannot assume that 
national archives have no military or intelligence value.
Current U.S. military guidance, for example, highlights the importance of 
protecting “enemy archives” not only as cultural property, but also because 
“[e]nemy archives can have an additional value . . . derived from archived infor-
mation that can be used for intelligence purposes or can be exploited.”16 The 
current U.S. counterinsurgency manual similarly notes the importance of “his-
torical documents and records” in analyzing insurgent networks.17 Along the 
same lines, the potential value of even noncurrent records within our own U.S. 
National Archives to a foreign adversary can be illustrated simply by the number 
of such records that remain classified, disclosure of which would, by definition, 
be “reasonably expected” to cause damage to national security.18
These are not new observations. “To the statesmen of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries,” Ernst Posner notes, “the archives of the enemy were the 
arcanum arcanorum that contained information on his secret policies, his 
resources, and his administrative techniques; hence getting hold of them, 
especially the archives of the foreign office, was the urgent desire of the 
invader.”19 During World War II, U.S. military officers were instructed to 
“consider all archives valuable, important, and in part vital for intelligence . . . 
purposes, whether located in ancient archives, large depositories, the most 
modern archives, or in current office papers.”20 Similarly, a 1983 national 
security directive governing the U.S. invasion of Grenada mandated the 
15   Trudy Huskamp Peterson, “Archives in Service to the State,” in Political Pressure and the Archival Record, 
ed. Margaret Procter, Michael Cook, and Caroline Williams (Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 
2005), 270. See also Lester K. Born, “International Cooperation to Preserve Historical Source 
Materials,” American Archivist 15 (1952): 219–30, 226 (which notes that the “fault” for the lack of a clear 
standard for archives under international law “perhaps lies with archives, for these are both a cultural 
property and an administrative property”).
16   Department of the Army, GTA 41-01-002, Civil Affairs, Arts, Monuments and Archives Guide (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of the Army, 2005), 19. 
17   Department of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Appendix B, B-15 (Washington, D.C.: Department 
of the Army, 2006).
18   Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (29 December 2009). On the usefulness of records from the 
National Archives in prosecuting World War II, see E. G. Campbell, “Old Records in a New War,” 
American Archivist 5 (1942): 156–58.
19   Ernst Posner, “Public Records under Military Occupation,” American Historical Review 49 (1944): 217.
20   Seymour J. Pomerenze, “Policies and Procedures for the Protection, Use, and Return of Captured 
German Records,” in Captured German and Related Records, ed. Robert Wolfe (Athens: University of Ohio 
Press, 1974).
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“immediate protection of all documents obtained in Grenada” in order “to 
ensure serious, dedicated, and well supported exploitation” of this “archive.”21
Archives also have legal and administrative value that can make them indis-
pensable to forces administering a military occupation and fulfilling duties such 
as establishing order, determining legal rights, detaining suspects, and prosecut-
ing crimes. Hilary Jenkinson and H. E. Bell stress the importance of preserving 
Italian records in World War II to assist with “the reconstitution of Civil Life.”22 
The U.S. counterinsurgency manual notes the value of census and property 
records for determining “who should or should not be living in a specific area” 
in order to “secure the populace.” Similarly, a 2006 report by the U.S. Marines 
concerning operations in Iraq entitled “Intelligence Exploitation of Enemy 
Material” stresses the importance of securing and properly handling captured 
documents as potential evidence in criminal cases in Iraqi courts.23
The archival community has not only historically acknowledged the value 
of “enemy” records and archives to military operations, but archivists sometimes 
led the effort to highlight this fact to government officials. As former SAA pres-
ident Oliver W. Holmes described in this journal, some of the efforts by the 
United States to protect foreign archives during World War II can directly be 
traced to a lunch meeting of archivists on 5 May 1943, during which Ernst Posner 
delivered his paper “Public Records under Military Occupation.”24 Posner noted 
that although an invading force may think that it “need not be greatly con-
cerned about the record of the past as preserved in the archives,” public records 
in fact “must become the continuous source of information for the regime of 
occupation.”25 In attendance at the meeting was Fred W. Shipman, the director 
of President Roosevelt’s library in Hyde Park, who sent a memorandum the next 
day to the president advising that “it will be of vital importance for those who 
are to be responsible for the administration of occupied territory to possess wide 
knowledge of the role which public and private records of conquered areas can 
and should play.”26 Shortly thereafter, President Roosevelt reportedly read 
21  National Security Decision Directive 112, “Processing and Disposition of Documents Acquired by U.S. 
Forces in Grenada,” 15 November 1983, Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/
offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-112.htm, accessed 30 June 2011. 
22  Hilary Jenkinson and H. E. Bell, Italian Archives during the War and at Its Close (London: H. M. Stationary 
Office, 1947), 13.
23  U.S. Marine Corps, Intelligence Exploitation of Enemy Material: Lessons and Observations from Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (June 2006), http://file.wikileaks.info/leak/us-intelligence-exploitation-of-enemy-mate-
rial-2006.pdf, accessed 30 June 2011.
24  Oliver W. Holmes, “The National Archives and the Protection of Records in War Areas,” American 
Archivist 9 (1944): 110–11.
25  Posner, “Public Records under Military Occupation,” 219–20. 
26  Fred W. Shipman, memorandum to President Franklin Roosevelt, 6 May 1943, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Presidential Library, Official File 20-D: State Dept.: Office of Foreign Economic Coordination, http://
www.dcoxfiles.com/fws.pdf, accessed 30 June 2011. The author thanks Robert Clark, supervisory archi-
vist at the FDR Presidential Library, who located and provided Shipman’s memorandum.
N a t i o N a l  a r c h i v e s  a N d  i N t e r N a t i o N a l  c o N f l i c t s :  
t h e  s o c i e t y  o f  a m e r i c a N  a r c h i v i s t s  a N d  W a r
t h e  a m e r i c a N  a r c h i v i s t
458
Shipman’s memorandum to his cabinet and instructed its members to “issue 
any necessary orders to see that records in war areas were given the necessary 
protection.”27
T h e  L i m i t a t i o n s  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a w
Given that government archives can have cultural and historical value on 
the one hand, and military, intelligence, and political value on the other, deter-
mining their status under international law during armed conflict is difficult. 
This reality affects the applicability, effectiveness, and enforceability of interna-
tional law. Past and current debates over the fate of archives in war nevertheless 
almost invariably center on international law, including assertions of “archival 
inalienability” and invocations of the laws designed to protect cultural property. 
The basic and simplified narrative of such controversies is that archives were 
seized—or “captured” or “plundered” or “pillaged” or “stolen”—during armed 
conflict and that international law requires their return—or “restitution” or 
“repatriation” or “replevin”—to the state that created them or the state that is 
otherwise purported to be their rightful owner.
What follows is an attempt to describe briefly the balance international law 
strikes between national and international interests in archives in both peace 
and war. The balance is not necessarily correct or appropriate, nor is it always 
clear. Briefly examining the limitations and inadequacies of international law 
can, it is hoped, both inform and spur future debate as well as make the rather 
modest point that assertions that international law unambiguously prohibits or 
requires something in relation to national archives in war should be approached 
with some skepticism. 
N a t i o n a l  S o v e r e i g n t y  a n d  N a t i o n a l  A r c h i v e s  i n  P e a c e
During peacetime, national interests dominate. Both national and interna-
tional laws provide for state sovereignty over state property, including records 
and archives, during peace. Archives that constitute cultural property, for exam-
ple, may be subject to both national and international limitations on export and 
import. National records can be legally inalienable, and any transfer of owner-
ship may well require “a legislative act of the State which created them.”28 This 
is one aspect of the concept of “archival inalienability” and the principle that 
27  Holmes, “The National Archives and the Protection of Records in War Areas,” 111.
28  International Council on Archives, “The View of the Archival Community on the Settling of Disputed 
Claims.” 
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allows governments to reclaim, through the legal device of replevin, archival 
records that may have fallen into private hands.29 
A state’s legal power over its national records in peace also extends to less 
popular acts such as limiting access to them on national security grounds and 
determining which records to destroy. Thus, the United States has the sovereign 
power to determine that less than 3 percent of its federal records are of such 
value that permanent preservation is necessary and to prosecute those who leak 
classified government records. The same power allows the government of 
Hungary to consider de-accessioning its former state security files, which could 
lead to their destruction, despite the concerns of the SAA, the larger archival 
community, and international interests in their preservation.30 While interna-
tional human rights commitments may prohibit particularly egregious acts, dur-
ing peace, the national interests of the state are paramount. 
T h e  C l a s h  o f  N a t i o n a l  I n t e r e s t s  d u r i n g  A r m e d  C o n f l i c t
During war, however, a separate regime, the international law of armed 
conflict, controls, altering the status of state property in a manner that does not 
necessarily comport with the concept of “archival inalienability.” Under the law 
of armed conflict, for example, state property of the enemy can be seized or 
destroyed during hostilities if required by “military necessity”—a term tradition-
ally defined very broadly to include those actions “indispensable for securing 
the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible.”31 The 1907 Hague 
Convention’s annexed Regulations, which still provide the most widely accepted 
standards for the law of armed conflict, allow the destruction or seizure of “the 
enemy’s property” during combat when “imperatively demanded by the neces-
sities of war.”32 Similarly, during an occupation, the occupying power can take 
possession of “all movable property belonging to the State which may be used 
for military operations.”33 The potential military and intelligence value of cer-
tain government archives may often, therefore, provide the requisite military 
necessity to justify their seizure.
The law of war, however, also provides special protections for artistic, scien-
tific, and historical property under the 1907 Hague Regulations and “cultural 
29  See, for example, Menzi L. Behrnd-Klodt, Navigating Legal Issues in Archives (Chicago: Society of 
American Archivists, 2008), 167–81.
30  See Helen R. Tibbo, SAA president, letter to Ambassador Gyorgy Szapary, 8 March 2001, http://www2.
archivists.org/sites/all/files/HungarianArchives3811_0.pdf, accessed 8 November 2011. 
31  Department of the Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (1956), 3, at 3–4. 
32  Convention (IV), “Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land” and its annex, “Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land,” 18 October 1907, Art. 23(g), International 
Committee of the Red Cross, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/195, accessed 30 June 2011.
33  1907 Hague Regulations, Art. 53.
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property” (including “archives”) under the 1954 Hague Convention, which 
reflect larger international interests in such property. The central question is 
the extent to which such protections encompass national archives. Each of these 
two regimes deserves a brief discussion.
The 1907 Hague Regulations contain two special provisions. Article 27 pro-
vides that during hostilities “all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as 
possible, buildings” dedicated to art or science or “historic monuments,” pro-
vided that “they are not being used at the time for military purposes.” Article 56 
provides that during an occupation, “the property of municipalities,” “historic 
monuments,” and institutions dedicated to “arts and sciences, even when State 
property, shall be treated as private property. All seizure of, destruction or willful 
damage done to institutions of this character, historic monuments, works of art 
and science, is forbidden.”
Neither Article 27 nor Article 56 of the 1907 Hague Regulations explicitly 
mentions archives, which has caused uncertainty within the archival community 
ever since. Ernst Posner opines, for example, that during World War I, “the head 
of the Belgian State Archives at Antwerp” was “not on secure ground when he 
pointed out to requisitioning German soldiers that his archives” were protected 
by the 1907 Hague Regulations. Posner notes that “[a]rchival establishments of 
a state” are “in the first place service agencies of the government and only sec-
ondarily institutions of a scientific character.”34 During World War II, Hilary 
Jenkinson and H. E. Bell’s report on Italian archives notes that it was “not clear” 
to what extent “the Archives of a State that is fought over” derives protection 
from the 1907 Hague Regulations.35 Posner’s report on German archives in 
World War II states more forcefully that German records of military value “do 
most certainly not enjoy the protection of articles 27 and 56” of the 1907 Hague 
Regulations.36 More recently, archivist Bruce P. Montgomery has argued that 
“[w]hile not addressing archives specifically,” the 1907 Hague Regulations 
“implied a distinction between archives maintained by cultural institutions, 
which are provided protected status, and government records of the state, which 
may be captured and exploited.”37 
A review of the drafting history of the ambiguous language in the 1907 
Hague Regulations reveals perhaps the first recorded international debate 
about the status of public records and archives in war. The relevant language 
was, in fact, only briefly discussed at the 1907 Hague Conference, but was derived 
34  Posner, “Public Records under Military Occupation,” 214.
35  Jenkinson and Bell, Italian Archives during the War and at Its Close, 3.
36  Ernst Posner, “Report on the Public Archives of Germany,” National Archives, Record Group 242, 
Pomerenze Collection, AGAR-S no. 301, 51–52 (emphasis added).
37  Bruce P. Montgomery, “Returning Evidence to the Scene of the Crime: Why the Anfal Files Should Be 
Repatriated to Iraqi Kurdistan,” Archivaria 69 (2010): 152.
461
N at i o N a l  a r c h i v e s  a N d  i N t e r N at i o N a l  c o N f l i c t s :  t h e  s o c i e t y  o f  a m e r i c a N  a r c h i v i s t s  a N d  W a r
almost word-by-word from the earlier nonbinding 1874 Brussels Declaration, 
which resulted from a conference organized by Russia.38 
The negotiating history of the 1874 Brussels Declaration describes that an 
Italian delegate, Baron Blanc, expressly suggested adding “public archives” to 
the list of protected property in the text. A Belgian delegate responded that 
adding the language was unnecessary because “it is not in the interest of any 
army to destroy the archives and records” of the enemy and therefore respect 
for them “goes without saying.” Another delegate opined that if “one is men-
tioning archives, one should say ‘civil records’ because military records will 
never be treated with respect” and that occupying forces may need certain 
archives. Baron Blanc therefore amended his proposal to clarify that protection 
would extend to “public archives and documents establishing the rights of citi-
zens in civil matters.” The German delegate, General Voigts-Rhetz, however, 
objected that it was “pointless to make a list” of protected documents “as it will 
be automatically incomplete” but added that “the occupier always has the right 
to seize military plans that might serve the war aims.” The record of the nego-
tiations then notes that the “Conference shares this opinion” and that Baron 
Blanc concluded by stating that “it suffices that his proposal be inserted” into 
the record of the negotiations along “with General Voigts-Rhetz’s 
explanations.”39
Although no language referencing archives was added, the sense of the 
1874 debate survives in leading commentators on international law. “As regards 
archives,” Oppenheim’s International Law, interpreting the 1907 Hague Regulations, 
states, “they are no doubt institutions for science, but a belligerent may never-
theless seize such State papers deposited therein as are of importance to him in 
connection with the war.”40 
The 1954 Hague Convention also places duties on state parties to safeguard 
and protect “cultural property,” which expressly includes the term “archives.” 
The exact parameters of that term and the protection the Convention intended, 
however, are similarly difficult to discern with clarity. Trudy Huskamp Peterson 
states that “the intent of the 1954 Convention is clearly to protect noncurrent 
historical materials, particularly those housed in a facility designated as an his-
torical archive.”41 Bruce P. Montgomery similarly interprets the Convention as 
38  See William M. Franklin, “Municipal Property under Belligerent Occupation,” American Journal of 
International Law 38 (1944): 385. A copy of the Brussels Declaration of 1874 is available at International 
Committee of the Red Cross, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/135?OpenDocument, accessed 30 
June 2011.
39  Actes de la Conference de Bruxelles (Brussels: F. Hayez, 1874), 243–44 (translations of quotations by Nicole 
Efros). See also Franklin, “Municipal Property under Belligerent Occupation,” 390. 
40  Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise: Disputes, War and Neutrality, ed. H. Lauterpacht, vol. 2, 
7th ed. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1952), § 138.
41  Peterson, “Archives in Service to the State,” 271.
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providing for the “protection of historical manuscripts and archives during war-
time, but not for current public records.”42 Michelle Caswell notes, however, 
that this distinction is not explicit in the language of the Convention.43 
Official commentary on an early draft of the Convention acknowledged the 
difficulty that “‘archives’ is interpreted in very different ways, from country to 
country.” For that reason, the initial draft did not use the term and instead used 
“collections of documents of scientific interest,” which, the commentary noted, 
“covers historical archives.”44 During the negotiations, however, both the United 
States and Spain proposed amendments adding a specific mention of “archives,” 
and the term was included in the final text.45 
Resolving the problem of determining exactly which “archives” are pro-
tected under the 1954 Hague Convention, however, also turns on two other 
factors. First, as a technical matter, the determination about whether specific 
property is “cultural property” to which the protections of the Convention 
extend is not necessarily an objective test but rather depends upon “the author-
ities of the country on whose territory the property is located.”46 That is, each 
state party to the Convention is empowered to decide which of its property satis-
fies the definition of cultural property “within the limits imposed by the ordi-
nary meaning of the words” and the “requirement of good faith.”47 With justifi-
cation, parties to the Convention may determine that their national archives or 
other centers holding government records are “of great importance to the cul-
tural heritage” of the nation and that the Convention should protect them as 
cultural property.48
Second, such determinations about cultural property status by state parties 
are possible because protections provided by the 1954 Hague Convention can 
42  Montgomery, “Returning Evidence to the Scene of the Crime,” 152.
43  Caswell, “ ‘Thank You Very Much, Now Give Them Back,’” 222. 
44  UNESCO, Records of the Conference Convened by UNESCO Held at The Hague from 21 April to 14 May 1954 
(The Hague: 1961), 308. The early commentary also stated that it “seems scarcely possible today” to 
“request the general protection of all scientific and cultural buildings” as the “over-ambitious” defini-
tion of the 1907 Hague Regulations had and noted in a passage, perhaps equally relevant to archives, 
that universities and laboratories “are doubtless scientific and cultural buildings, but it would be aim-
ing too high, with the risk of getting too little, to attempt to extend to them the protection to be 
accorded cultural property” on the basis that, for example, “the laboratory of a science faculty may 
sometimes be used for the direct pursuit of hostilities.” UNESCO, Records, 307. 
45  UNESCO, Records, 118. The proposal to include a specific mention of archives was adopted by the 
delegates with “35 votes in favour, 0 against and 2 absentions.” UNESCO, Records, 132. 
46  Jiri Toman, The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth, 
1996), 49.
47  Roger O’Keefe, The Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 105–6.
48  Periodic reports on the implementation of the 1954 Hague Convention from state parties provide 
some evidence of the extent to which parties include archives, UNESCO, http://portal.unesco.org/
culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=36814&URL_DO=DO_PRINTPAGE&URL_SECTION=201.html, 
accessed 30 June 2011.
463
N at i o N a l  a r c h i v e s  a N d  i N t e r N at i o N a l  c o N f l i c t s :  t h e  s o c i e t y  o f  a m e r i c a N  a r c h i v i s t s  a N d  W a r
be waived “where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver.”49 That 
is, the international protections of the Convention are subject to a significant 
exception for “military necessity” that defers to the national interests of the 
combatants. The 1954 Hague Convention cannot be used, therefore, to immu-
nize fully archives that contain records of military value from all military action 
because such value may trigger the waiver for imperative military necessity. 
In the end, the effective standard for archives in the 1954 Hague Convention 
is arguably not dissimilar to the 1907 Hague Regulations. A succinct and up-to-
date explanation of the status of archives in war is found in the current Manual 
of the Law of Armed Conflict of the U.K. Ministry of Defence, which states, “Official 
documents and papers connected with the armed conflict may be seized, even 
if they are part of official archives, because they will be of military significance. 
However, other types of archival documents, as well as crown jewels, pictures, 
and art collections may not be seized.”50 
P o s t w a r  R e s t i t u t i o n  a n d  A r c h i v a l  I n a l i e n a b i l i t y
The more difficult and controversial legal issue is the long-term effect of the 
seizure of records and archives during combat or occupation, which directly 
implicates the question of whether archives can remain “inalienable” during 
wartime seizure. Under the laws of war, enemy state property lawfully seized 
during hostilities pursuant to military necessity generally becomes the property 
of the capturing state. “Public property captured or seized from the enemy,” 
summarizes the U.S. Army Field Manual on the Law of Land Warfare, “is property 
of the United States.”51 Moreover, state property seized during occupation that 
is necessary for military operations can also become the property of the seizing 
state.52  
Under the 1907 Hague Regulations, however, property devoted to “arts and 
sciences” or “municipal” property encompassed within Article 56 must be 
treated as private property which can still be used if necessary, but which “must 
be restored . . . when peace is made.”53 Similarly, the 1954 Hague Convention 
provides some protection against “misappropriation,” “requisitioning,” and, for 
cultural property being transported subject to special conditions, immunity 
from “seizure, capture, and prize.”54 As described above, however, the question 
49  1954 Hague Convention, Art. 4(2).
50  U.K. Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), § 11.89.1.
51  Department of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare, 50.
52  Oppenheim, International Law, § 137.
53  1907 Hague Regulations, Art. 53.
54  1954 Hague Convention, Arts. 4(3), 14.
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remains to what extent such protections encompass archives or records of 
potential military value, which in practice may be both a legal and factually 
intensive question.55
The concept of “archival inalienability” separately asserts a special status 
specific to archives. In describing the inalienability of archives, for example, 
former secretary general of the International Council on Archives Charles 
Kecskemeti acknowledges the right of combatants in “the exploitation of ‘cap-
tured’ archives for military, political, scientific or administrative objectives,” but 
states that the “capture of archives in the course of war” gives no rights beyond 
temporary custody and that “any decision to appropriate archives, seized during 
military campaigns or times of occupation” has “in fact, no legal value.”56 In 
support of the special status of archives, the concept of archival inalienability 
relies in part upon a history of treaties dating at least as far back as the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648 that has, it is argued, “progressively established” a “practice, 
implicitly respected” that “archives captured or displaced during hostilities were 
returned once peace was concluded.”57 
The reliance on such treaties to assert a binding international practice or 
custom, however, is fraught with difficulty. In evaluating this historical practice, 
for example, U.N. special rapporteur Mohammed Bedjaoui stresses that one 
should not lose “sight of the fact that this practice derives above all from peace 
treaties, which are generally based not so much on equitable decisions as on 
political solutions reflecting the power relationship of victor and vanquished.”58 
Put another way, treaties negotiated at the end of an armed conflict will almost 
always reflect unequal bargaining positions. Ernst Posner’s description of the 
negotiation of the Treaty of St. Germain in 1919, which is among the treaties 
used to support the state practice, provides a striking example. Posner notes 
that “Austria’s bargaining position was extremely weak” and that, therefore, 
55  The negotiating history of the 1874 Brussels Declaration does provide some support. The German 
delegate, General Voigts-Rhetz, stated that “the occupier always has the right to seize military plans 
that might serve the war aims, but,” he added, “it must provide a receipt.” Actes de la Conference de 
Bruxelles, 244.
56  Charles Kecskemeti, “Activities of UNESCO and ICA since 1976, Part 2,” in International Council on 
Archives, Interdependence of Archives: Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth, Thirtieth and Thirty-first International 
Conference of the Round Table on Archives (Paris: International Council on Archives, 1993–95), 84. See 
also Peterson, “Archives in Service to the State,” 276. (“In the end, the documents of a state are inalien-
able and remain subject to replevin without limitation.”)
57  International Council on Archives, “The View of the Archival Community on the Settling of Disputed 
Claims.” A list of these treaties can be found in, among other places, Mohammed Bedjaoui, “Eleventh 
Report on Succession of States in Respect of Matters Other than Treaties—Draft Articles on Succession 
in Respect of State Archives,” in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. 2 (U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/322, 1979), 82–93. 
58  Bedjaoui, “Eleventh Report on Succession of States in Respect of Matters Other than Treaties—Draft 
Articles on Succession in Respect of State Archives,” 11, 92. 
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“she had to sacrifice archives, without which people can live, to get bread and 
other food, without which they cannot live.”59
The complex interaction of wartime capture, historical treaty practice, and 
the inalienability of state property, which is perhaps best explored by example, 
is illustrated in a remarkable December 2009 decision by a French administra-
tive tribunal. The decision concerned 297 royal manuscripts seized in Korea in 
1866 by French forces and housed in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France. 
The plaintiff in the case, a South Korean cultural organization, relied upon 
historical treaties as evidence, citing “clauses for restitution of documents . . . 
looted during times of war” in the Treaty of Paris in 1814, the Treaty of Vienna 
in 1864, and the 1866 treaty between Prussia and the Grand Duchy of Hesse in 
arguing that “an international custom, a general practice accepted as law, pre-
vailed” at the time of the 1866 seizure of the royal records and therefore the 
court should order their restitution to Korea. The tribunal rejected the argu-
ment and held that the Korean manuscripts had in fact become “national trea-
sures” of France notwithstanding their “foreign origin” and that they now con-
stituted inalienable state property of the French government. The tribunal held that 
it could not force the restitution of the records to South Korea absent an act by 
the French government to “declassify” them as French property.60  
While the French decision relies in part on the fact that the 1866 seizure 
occurred prior to both the 1907 and 1954 Hague Conventions, during a time in 
which seizure did not necessarily require military necessity, the result in the case 
is not inconsistent with the treatment of captured records in some more mod-
ern conflicts. When the United States decided to return seized records to 
Germany following World War II, for example, it made clear that “legal title” to 
at least a portion of the seized materials was “held by the United States 
Government” and that those records would be “donated” to Germany.61 Ernst 
Posner’s report on German records similarly notes that some of the seized 
records “may be considered bona fide war booty that may be retained 
indefinitely.”62
The United States treated the seized German records not only as U.S. prop-
erty, but also as U.S. federal records. Transfers were based on the Archivist’s 
determination that the original records did not have “sufficient administrative, 
59  Posner, “Effects of Changes of Sovereignty on Archives,” 152.
60  Tribunal Administratif de Paris, Association for Cultural Action, No. 0701946, 18 December 2009 (on 
file with author) (quotations translated by Nicole Efros). The manuscripts were subsequently returned 
to South Korea pursuant to a renewable lease agreement between the French and South Korean gov-
ernments.
61  General Records Schedule, “Seized German Records,” 1 August 1953, National Archives, Record 
Group 242, Pomerenze Collection, AGAR-S No. 3144, http://www.dcoxfiles.com/3144.pdf, accessed 
30 June 2011.
62  Posner, “Report on the Public Archives of Germany,” 58. See also Pomerenze, “Policies and Procedures 
for the Protection, Use, and Return of Captured German Records,” 25.
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legal research or other value to warrant their further preservation by the United 
States Government.”63 Neither is this practice confined to the World War II era. 
The U.S. Army has a general records schedule, for example, approved by the 
Archivist in 1983, encompassing documents “captured or confiscated in war-
time by international law.”64 More recently, the original records captured by U.S. 
forces in Iraq during Desert Storm in 1991 were scheduled as U.S. federal 
records in 2002 by the Defense Intelligence Agency.65 
At other times, the United States has treated seized records quite differ-
ently. During the Vietnam War, for example, the U.S. military took the position 
that “enemy documents captured in the Republic of Vietnam are legally the 
property of the Vietnamese government” and only retained microfilm copies.66 
According to NARA, the Department of Defense (DOD) similarly agreed to 
treat records captured in Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989 as the prop-
erty of Panama.67 This did not, however, prevent a significant controversy 
between the United States and Panama over custody and access to the 15,000 
boxes of seized documents.68
There have been debates within the U.S. government itself about the status 
of captured foreign records. Archivist Greg Bradsher describes a debate over 
whether international law provided only the “right to custody and use” of records 
seized in Japan or whether title had passed.69 Similarly, there was a public debate 
within the U.S. government over the legal status of records seized by U.S. forces 
in Haiti in 1994. The DOD reportedly argued that the documents “became 
63  General Records Schedule, “Seized German Records,” 1. 
64  Request for Records Disposition Authority, SF 115, Job. No. NC1-AU-83-33, approved 4 November 
1983, http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/rcs/schedules/departments/department-of-defense/
department-of-the-army/rg-au/nc1-au-83-033_sf115.pdf, accessed 30 June 2011.
65   Request for Records Disposition Authority, SF 115, Job. No. N1-373-02-3, approved 9 August 2002, 
http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/rcs/schedules/departments/department-of-defense/
defense-agencies/rg-0373/n1-373-02-003_sf115.pdf, accessed 30 June 2011.
66   U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, MACV J2 Study of the Exploitation of Captured Enemy 
Documents in SVN (San Franciso, Calif.: United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam, 1968), 
15.
67   John W. Carlin, Archivist of the United States, letter to Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. secretary of defense, 
17 April 2003, 1, http://www.dcoxfiles.com/17.pdf, accessed 30 June 2011.
68   See, for example, John Otis, “Magistrate Accuses U.S. of Obstructing Justice,” United Press International, 
13 May 1990 (stating that a “Panamanian magistrate said U.S. officials are obstructing justice by restrict-
ing his access to documents he needs to investigate former associates of ousted military ruler Manuel 
Antonio Noriega”).
69   Greg Bradsher, “A ‘Constantly Recurring Irritant,’ Returning Captured and Seized Japanese Records, 
1946–1961,” in Researching Japanese War Crimes, ed. Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government 
Records Interagency Working Group (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
2006), 175.
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American property when United States troops seized them.”70 A 1995 memoran-
dum prepared by the American Law Division of the Congressional Research 
Service requested by Representative John Conyers, however, asserts quite force-
fully that the DOD’s position “would appear to be mistaken” and that under 
international law the records belonged “to the Haitian state, and their retention 
by the U.S. government violates Haiti’s ownership rights.”71 
NARA acknowledges that since World War II the legal status of captured 
records has been an “evolving process.”72 Writing in this journal in 1962, archi-
vist Bess Glenn describes the evolution with some exasperation, stating that U.S. 
policies on records seized in war have “followed a meandering course” that has 
generally “followed a policy of self-interest, of expediency, rather than a consis-
tent principle of law” and that the United States has made only a “feeble and 
inconclusive effort to achieve a solution to the question as to the legal status of 
the seized records.”73 
To bring this issue up to the present, the author asked the DOD whether 
the United States has a formal position on whether the forty-eight thousand 
boxes seized by U.S. forces in Iraq remained the property of Iraq, as NARA had 
urged,74 or whether title had passed to the United States upon capture. The 
response from a defense official illustrates that the “evolving process”—a mix of 
law and diplomacy—continues: 
The U.S. government will consider requests from the Government of Iraq to 
return captured Iraqi governmental documents. Neither the law of war nor 
pertinent Security Council resolutions mandate a particular time frame for 
the return of property such as these documents, but the needs of the Iraqi 
government for the return of the documents will be considered.75
Finally, having discussed at some length relevant laws of armed conflict and 
the concept of “archival inalienability,” the reality that must always be faced is 
70  Larry Rohter, “Haiti Accuses U.S. of Holding Data Recovered by G.I.s,” New York Times, 28 November 
1995, A1. Interestingly, the DOD apparently took this position despite the fact that the U.S. military 
treated the Haiti operation as a “military operation other than war,” which meant that the law of armed 
conflict was not triggered and therefore, by its own account, “Haitian public property that fell into the 
hands of United States soldiers remained Haitian public property.” Center for Law and Military 
Operations, Law and Military Operations in Haiti 1994–1995: Lessons Learned for Judge Advocates 
(Charlottesville, Va.: Center for Law and Military Operations, 1995), 129.
71  Harry G. Gourevitch, Congressional Research Service, memorandum, “Seizure of Haitian Documents 
by the American Military,” to Representative John Conyers, Jr., 12 December 1995, http://www.dcox-
files.com/12.pdf, accessed 30 June 2011. The author thanks Arif Haque from the office of Rep. 
Conyers for providing a copy of this memorandum. 
72  Carlin to Rumsfeld, 17 April 2003, 1.
73  Bess Glenn, “Private Records Seized by the United States in Wartime—Their Legal Status,” American 
Archivist 25 (1962): 405.
74  Carlin to Rumsfeld, 17 April 2003, 1.
75  Defense Intelligence Agency, email message to author, 8 March 2011.
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that the often-ambiguous standards of international law will, in their actual 
application, be subject to broad interpretations as well as abuse. As SAA presi-
dent Waldo G. Leland declared in 1941: “Regretfully we have reached the con-
clusion that international conventions for the protection of historic and artistic 
treasures are of no avail under the conditions of total warfare.”76 Similarly, Trudy 
Huskamp Peterson notes, “Armies seize every type of document they encounter, 
and they are likely to continue to do so, irrespective of what the Conventions 
say. Insisting on adherence to complicated rules and fine distinctions will go 
nowhere.”77 
A r c h i v i s t s  a t  W a r  a n d  P e a c e
The tensions between international and national interests in archives and 
the inadequacy of international law in providing a clear, appropriate, and 
enforceable balance present both challenges and opportunities for archivists 
and professional organizations such as the SAA. Future debates about the role 
of archives and archivists in war should acknowledge the reality that protecting 
archives in war involves a more complicated calculation than relying on disaster 
preparedness principles or urging compliance with ambiguous legal protec-
tions for cultural property. 
The archival community should perhaps consider the implications of the 
observation of Hilary Jenkinson and H. E. Bell that 
Whatever may be the position in International Law of the Archives of a State 
that is fought over . . . no modern State can, in fact, afford to countenance 
their wholesale destruction. Protective measures may be undertaken with 
very different motives, good or bad; but some form of protection there is 
bound to be.78
Examining the realities of the competing national and international inter-
ests provides a useful way of identifying where the policies and goals of the 
archival community converge or diverge with the interests and incentives both 
of combatants during hostilities and states during postconflict debates over the 
return of displaced archives. 
76  Waldo G. Leland, “The Archivist in Times of Emergency,” American Archivist 4(1941): 3.
77  Peterson, “Archives in Service to the State,” 273.
78  Jenkinson and Bell, Italian Archives during the War and at Its Close, 3.
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The same military, intelligence, or administrative uses for national archives 
that complicate legal issues have practical consequences that affect the tactical 
balance of national and international interests in their wartime preservation in 
sometimes counterintuitive ways. In a traditional armed conflict, for example, 
the value of archives creates a military incentive for “attacking” forces to avoid 
damaging or destroying the archives of the “defending” government and to 
secure them intact.79 
“Defending” governments, in contrast, often have an incentive to prevent 
the capture of their records and archives, which may involve evacuation or con-
cealment. In the extreme circumstances of war, however, this can extend to 
destroying records and archives to prevent their capture by the advancing 
enemy. As Ernst Posner notes, nations defending against invasion “have discov-
ered that in their fight against the conqueror the destruction of records may be 
a weapon as powerful as the dynamiting of railroads and the blowing up of 
bridges.”80 
In war, therefore, archivists and human rights organizations may at times 
find their interests, as well as international interests in preservation, partially 
aligned with the national and military interests of attacking forces and at times 
in direct conflict with national rights of ownership, self-defense, and sovereignty 
of the “defending” government.81  
The issue is far from theoretical. The expertise of archivists and their role 
in the execution of national policies provide opportunities not simply for 
advocacy, but for intervention. The archival community might argue, for 
example, that the preservation of archives ought to trump any national inter-
ests and invocations of “military necessity” that might lead to destruction or 
damage. In doing so, the archival community must also consider the practical 
and ethical issues that are raised when such professional positions are con-
verted into action. 
The order by Iraqi government officials to destroy Ba’ath Party records 
within the Iraqi National Archives, for example, arguably would have presented 
an ethical conflict between “national” duties to a government and to national 
79  Of course, these incentives are altered in conflicts in which an attacking force intends to destroy, rather 
than exploit, the national documents of its enemy as part of a larger plan of ethnic cleansing or geno-
cide. See, for example, Society of American Archivists, “Resolution on the Systematic Destruction of 
Archives in Kosovo and War-Caused Devastation of Archives throughout Yugoslavia,” 14 April 1999.
80  Ernst Posner, “The Administration of Current Records in Italian Public Agencies,” in Archives and the 
Public Interest, ed. Ken Munden (Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 2006), 98.
81  As mentioned above, the sovereign’s right of ownership over state property generally includes the 
power to destroy. See also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “The Right to Destroy,” Yale Law Journal 114 (2005): 
781–854.
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law, on the one hand, and what the SAA’s Code of Ethics for Archivists describes 
as an archivist’s “fundamental obligation” to the preservation of records in his 
or her care and its mandate that archivists must not “alter, manipulate, or 
destroy data or records to conceal facts or distort evidence,” on the other.82 
Patricia Kennedy Grimsted similarly describes the Soviet “scorched earth” pol-
icy in which Ukranian archivists were ordered to destroy archives they could 
not evacuate in advance of the Nazi invasion. “In Odesa,” Grimsted writes, 
“archivists protested the destruction order and refused to destroy pre-revolu-
tionary records,” but after it became clear no more could be evacuated, the 
order was fulfilled.83  
While such extreme circumstances and stark choices may be rare, more 
common roles for archivists in nations under siege also present ethical and 
professional complexities that are easy to overlook. In his 1941 address, 
Archivists in Times of National Emergency, for example, SAA president Waldo G. 
Leland noted that in times of war, the archivist “has public duties of transcen-
dent importance” and that the “[f]irst of such duties is the obligation to take 
the necessary steps to assure the physical safety of the records in his custody.”84 
On Leland’s suggestion, the SAA formed special committees that produced a 
report entitled The Care of Records in a National Emergency, which the National 
Archives published in a bulletin. The report describes the “hazards likely to 
affect archives,” including not only bombardment and fire, but “possible enemy 
action such as occupation, resulting in seizure” and provides detailed guidance 
on evacuation.85 
The evacuation or concealment of purely cultural archives having no mili-
tary value to protect them from combat dangers is not only appropriate, but 
highly desirable. The potential military value of national records and archives, 
however, can alter the character of such protective measures. If such actions are 
designed, for example, to shield archival records that may have potential mili-
tary value from the enemy or to delay or frustrate attempts by the enemy to 
locate them, these may be in the national interest, but they are not neutral acts 
and may also place other archives at greater risk. The Germans in World War II, 
for example, concealed records in “at least one thousand” different places, 
82  Society of American Archivists, Code of Ethics for Archivists, approved by SAA Council, 5 February 
2005.
83  Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, Trophies of War and Empire: The Archival Heritage of Ukraine, World War II, and 
the International Politics of Restitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 193–94.
84  Leland, “The Archivist in Times of Emergency,” 2. Leland warns that war plans must be made that are 
“capable of immediate execution” and describes visiting “the cellars of the Bibliothèque Nationale in 
Paris” which he found “full of evacuation boxes.”
85  National Archives, The Care of Records in a National Emergency, bulletin no. 3 (December 1941), 7. For 
additional information on SAA activities during World War II, see Philip C. Brooks, “Archives in the 
United States during World War II, 1939–45,” Library Quarterly 17 (1947): 263–80.
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which necessitated at least one Allied “Operation ‘Hidden Documents.’ ”86 Such 
a strategy places all possible hiding places, including other records and archival 
centers, at increased risk for searches, seizures, and ransacking by troops. 
As a practical matter, the process of seizing records during war is always a 
messy one. While current U.S. Army instructions provide detailed guidance, for 
example, on “Document Exploitation and Handling” for intelligence purposes 
(including guidance that seeks to preserve context), the reality of wartime oper-
ations is often very different.87 As Trudy Huskamp Peterson notes, given “the 
urgency of wartime activity” and “the language problems of soldiers unable to 
read records they are encountering,” the “impulse to sweep up all documents 
and sort them out later is well near irresistible.”88 
The obligation to distinguish between records of military value and those 
of purely cultural value, however, does not fall solely on “attacking” forces. 
International law also requires “defending” forces to distinguish between mili-
tary and civilian objectives by not, for instance, concealing military forces within 
a civilian population or stationing lawful targets, such as tanks, in close proxim-
ity to protected places, such as museums.89 The problem that should be acknowl-
edged for national archives is that cultural material and material of potential 
military or intelligence value can be located not only in the same building, but 
also even in the same record.
If the international goal of preserving archives were paramount, the archi-
vist of a “defending” government’s national archives might consider policies to 
ensure, to the extent principles such as respect des fonds allow, that archives of a 
purely cultural or historical nature and those of potential military value are not 
collocated and to clearly identify and differentiate them for invading forces. 
Moreover, during an invasion, a possible best practice might be not only to sur-
render control over the archives to the invading enemy as soon as possible, but 
also to actively assist those forces in the efficient location and utilization of 
records in his or her care that could be of value, which could potentially discour-
age displacement and related threats to context. Such an ideal, however, might 
place the archivist in direct opposition to his or her own government.
86  Pomerenze, “Policies and Procedures for the Protection, Use, and Return of Captured German 
Records,” 20.
87  Department of the Army, FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of the Army, 2006), Appendix I.
88  Peterson, “Archives in Service to the State,” 273.
89  The SAA acknowledged the practical reasons for such rules in a third statement regarding Iraqi 
archives in 2007, expressing deep concern about Iraqi National Guard troops occupying the Iraqi 
National Archives and warning that the “placement of troops in or near such institutions has the 
potential of drawing enemy violence towards the repository.” Society of American Archivists, “Iraq 
National Library and Archives in Jeopardy,” 8 August 2007. The view of the United States, in fact, is 
that “the primary responsibility for the protection of cultural objects rests with the Party controlling 
the property to ensure that it is properly identified and that it is not used for an unlawful purpose.” 
U.S. Senate, Executive Document No. 110-26 (2008), 10. 
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In advancing the goal of protecting national archives, the archival commu-
nity should also consider the historical relationship between archivists and the 
work of “attacking” forces. Waldo G. Leland’s second address as SAA president 
in 1942, for example, describes the active contributions during World War I of 
archivists and historians.90 In World War II, archivists were similarly active in the 
war effort. Leaders in the profession, such as Hilary Jenkinson and Fred W. 
Shipman, were on the ground actively involved in the protection of foreign 
archives alongside officers in the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives (MFA&A) 
units.91 
The U.S. National Archives itself was designated a defense agency and 
shared its office space with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor 
to the Central Intelligence Agency.92 The National Archives also directly con-
tributed to projects for the War Department and the OSS, “the nature of which,” 
Oliver W. Holmes stated in 1946, “we are requested still to keep confidential.”93 
Ernst Posner, in coordination with the National Archives, created detailed lists 
of archival repositories in Europe and Asia, which not only assisted in their pro-
tection, but were also used as “reference tools” for military intelligence.94 
Such efforts sought to capitalize on the alignment of the interests of archi-
vists seeking preservation of foreign records with Allied military interests in 
exploiting records and archives for military and intelligence purposes. Archivist 
Lester Born, for example, notes that the goals of protection and the goals of 
exploitation should not in reality be opposed as “[m]uch better intelligence 
results could be obtained from material not ransacked chaotically.”95 During 
World War II, the U.S. military went so far as to say that “the effective imposition 
of Military Government” in Germany “may depend largely upon how successful 
we are” in “safeguarding archives.”96 More recently, training given to U.S. 
Marines in Iraq gravely warned that failure to preserve and properly handle 
seized documents could result in fellow Marines being killed by insurgents who 
are released due to insufficient evidence to justify their detention.97 
The possible alignment of archival and military interests can be illustrated 
as much by failure as by success. Within days of the fire that destroyed the 
90  Waldo G. Leland, “Historians and Archivists in the First World War,” American Archivist 5 (1942): 
1–17.
91  See, generally, Report of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic 
Monuments in War Areas (1946).
92  See Jennifer Davis Heaps, “Clio’s Spies: The National Archives and the Office of Strategic Services in 
World War II,” Prologue 30 (Fall 1998): 194–207. 
93  Holmes, “The National Archives and the Protection of Records in War Areas.” 110–27. 
94  Holmes, “The National Archives and the Protection of Records in War Areas,” 116.
95  Lester K. Born, “Archives and War,” Indian Archives 4 (1950): 159. 
96  T. J. Davis, foreword to Allied Forces, Supreme Headquarters, U.S. Adjutant-General’s Office, General 
List of Archives in Western Germany (1945), 1. 
97  U.S. Marine Corps, Intelligence Exploitation of Enemy Material, 6.
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archival records of the Ba’ath Party in the Iraqi National Archives, destruction 
that its staff had earlier refused to undertake, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld implicitly acknowledged U.S. military and political interests in the 
records’ preservation by including among the “unfinished missions to complete” 
the need to secure the records of Ba’ath Party members.98 
Alliances between archivists and the military are far from perfect. Hilary 
Jenkinson and H. E. Bell, for example, note problems arising while working with 
British forces in Italy based on the fact that
Intelligence Officers were liable to carry off whole files, to remove single 
papers from their related documents, to disturb the order of papers, and so 
on, without realizing that, by doing so, they were not only impairing the his-
torical value of the collection but also impeding the work of other Agencies 
that might follow them.99
Others may find any such alliance unholy. The recent and highly publi-
cized debate within the social sciences community, for example, about whether 
it is ethical for social science researchers, such as anthropologists, to assist mili-
tary forces might raise interesting, but difficult, questions for the archival pro-
fession.100 Historian Kathy Peiss notes that in many fields the close relationship 
that existed between cultural leaders and government and military officials in 
the World War II period became “frayed” in the second half of the last century 
and that reaching “across the divide now seems impossible for both sides.” 
There is fault on both sides. “Scholars, intellectuals, and cultural figures,” Peiss 
suggests, “often prefer the purist’s position as outsider and critic to messy inter-
actions with civilian and military leaders.”101 At the same time, good faith attempts 
by academic and cultural property professionals to provide guidance to govern-
ment and military officials have often fallen on deaf ears.102
The extensive involvement of NARA archivists within the SAA, however, 
including even the regular contributions from the Archivist of the United States 
98  Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, news transcript, DoD news briefing, 11 April 2003, U.S. 
Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2367, 
accessed 30 June 2011.
99  Jenkinson and Bell, Italian Archives during the War and at Its Close, 21.
100 See, for example, American Anthropological Association, “AAA Opposes U.S. Military’s Human 
Terrain System,” http://www.aaanet.org/issues/AAA-Opposes-Human-Terrain-System-Project.cfm, 
accessed 30 June 2011.
101 Kathy Peiss, “Cultural Property in a Time of War: The American Response to Endangered Books in 
World War II,” Library Trends 55 (2007): 382.
102 The looting of the Iraqi Museum in 2003, for example, resulted in the resignation of three members 
of the President’s Advisory Committee on Cultural Property. The chairman of the committee, museum 
director Martin E. Sullivan, stated in his resignation letter that scholars had provided the State 
Department with detailed information about locations of archaeological sites and museum collections 
and that the destruction and looting in Iraq was foreseeable, but “was not prevented, due to our 
nation’s inaction.” Carl Hartman, “White House Art Advisers Quit to Protest Looting of Baghdad 
Museum,” Associated Press, 17 April 2003.
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in Archival Outlook, perhaps provides a closer relationship between the 
professional organization and the government than exists in many other fields. 
NARA continues to make itself available to the U.S. military in relation to the 
issue of records seized by U.S. forces. In April 2003, the Archivist offered NARA 
assistance to the DOD “in dealing with the documents that Coalition forces are 
securing from the Iraqi Government and other institutions.”103 The Archivist 
specifically cited providing “guidance relating to the legal status of the records 
and protecting their evidential value, and technical assistance relating to 
preserving original records and in scanning records to obtain copies that your 
agency may need for business purposes including for future judicial uses.”104  
Similarly, the SAA maintains an affiliation with the U.S. Committee of the 
Blue Shield, which coordinates with governmental officials and provides train-
ing to military units about the importance of protecting cultural property, 
including archives.105 Certain functions of the World War II MFA&A units are 
also performed by U.S. civil affairs units, which produced, as recently as 2005, 
an Arts, Monuments and Archives Guide.106 
Finally, any discussion about the advisability of, and any related ethical con-
straints on, greater engagement by members of the archival community in mili-
tary operations, should not ignore the possible consequences of complete neu-
trality. During the Vietnam War, seized documents sent to the Captured 
Document Exploitation Center in Saigon for analysis arrived “in every conceiv-
able type of container ranging from sandbags and cans to trailer loads.”107 
Similarly, descriptions from Iraq of “heaps of documents,” which were “left 
exposed to the elements” and “eventually put in garbage bags,” that “sometimes 
had some data describing where they were collected, but often did not,” provide 
a compelling argument for the need for more extensive involvement and 
engagement by those with expertise in preserving context.108 
A r c h i v i s t s ,  P o s t w a r  R e s t i t u t i o n ,  a n d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A c c e s s 
In postconflict periods, archivists should revisit debates about what 
principles should guide restitution of, and international access to, seized or 
103 Carlin to Rumsfeld, 17 April 2003, 1.
104 Carlin to Rumsfeld, 17 April 2003, 1.
105 U.S. Committee of the Blue Shield website is at http://www.uscbs.org/about_us.htm, accessed 30 June 
2011. The “Blue Shield” refers to the symbol created by the 1954 Hague Convention that is meant to 
clearly identify cultural property to combatants during armed conflict. The Blue Shield operates as 
the cultural equivalent of the Red Cross or Red Crescent.
106 Department of the Army, GTA 41-01-002, Civil Affairs, Arts, Monuments and Archives Guide (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of the Army, 2005).
107 U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, MACV J2 Study of the Exploitation of Captured Enemy 
Documents in SVN, 11.
108 Charles Duelfer, Hide and Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq (New York: Public Affairs, 2009), 339.
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displaced archives. Such debates should not rest on old assumptions and should 
consider practical solutions that are based on reassessing the balance of national 
and international interests.
First, consideration and debate about whether, when, and where archives 
seized during war are returned should be unhindered by the notion that “archi-
val inalienability” or international law inflexibly compels specific results. 
Moreover, the practical and political reality that, even where assertions of inter-
national legal obligations of return are compelling, the nation with custody will 
not return records that conflict with its own national security interests should 
also be acknowledged. Indeed, such a nation should perhaps not be encour-
aged to return records that may raise international security concerns.
In this light, the joint SAA/ACA call for the return of several different 
groups of records to the Iraqi National Archives—including not only those 
seized by U.S. forces, but records seized by Kurds in the First Gulf War—appears 
to reflect a result that seems pre-ordained by the invocation of the “inalienable 
character of national records.” While return to Iraq may arguably be the appro-
priate solution for those groups of records, “repatriation” should not become 
the only acceptable solution to records seized in war. The internationalist vision 
of Solon Buck’s “The Archivist’s ‘One World,’” for example, in which he pro-
poses an “international” archives that could include “military and similar records 
of aggressor nations that have been defeated . . . that, although national in ori-
gin should not in the interests of world peace be left in the custody of the nation 
that created them,” should at least have a seat at the table.109  
Among the records seized by U.S. forces in Iraq, for example, are docu-
ments that, according to arms control experts consulted by the New York Times, 
“constitute a basic guide to building an atom bomb.”110 Bruce P. Montgomery 
argues that the Anfal files seized by Kurdish fighters in 1991 should be “repatri-
ated to Iraqi Kurdistan” rather than to the Iraqi National Archives in part on the 
basis of “the possible misuse of the files by Arab parties against Kurdish political 
opponents.” More broadly, Montgomery notes the dangers of “returning intel-
ligence documents to a successor state government that may exploit them 
against dissidents, or entire populations, or religious groups.”111 
The United States made related determinations in earlier wars. It excluded 
from the return of both German and Japanese records seized in World War II, 
for example, those documents that would “jeopardize the national security 
109 Buck, “The Archivist’s ‘One World,’” 15.
110 William J. Broad, “U.S. Web Archive Is Said to Reveal Nuclear Primer,” New York Times, 3 November 
2008, A1.
111 Montgomery, “Returning Evidence to the Scene of the Crime,” 145, 160.
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interests of the United States or its Allies.”112 Of particular relevance for Ba’ath 
Party records, the U.S. government also excluded from the initial return of 
German records those “tending to glorify the Nazi regime, or which are of 
inherent propaganda character, or which deal with the organization, personnel, 
and operation of Nazi party institutions, except where such transfer would not 
jeopardize the democratic way of life in the Federal Republic.”113 
Views can differ on whether such records should be returned. Some may 
validly view the withholding of any seized records in this manner as insufferable 
paternalism or an affront to national rights. However, any view that such an 
important debate is unnecessary, based on the belief that international law 
already unquestionably provides a single answer, begs for reconsideration.
Second are the related issues of access and preservation. The 2008 SAA/
ACA statement on Iraqi records, for example, thoughtfully balances the national 
interests in the demand for return with the international interests in access to 
seized records by noting that past U.S. practice has been to return seized records 
“after copies were made for historical purposes and broad public access.” The 
SAA/ACA expressly calls upon the United States, private parties, and other gov-
ernments “to find appropriate repositories for copies made from the Iraqi 
records and to ensure that these repositories make the copies accessible to 
researchers at the earliest practical date.”114 Such views are consistent with 
enthusiastic reactions within this journal to the public availability in the 1950s 
of the “great historic treasure” of German records seized during World War II.115 
This is also consistent with efforts to include clauses that require granting access 
to future researchers within agreements for the return of seized records.116
The advocacy for such international access to seized records may itself be a 
departure from the simultaneous invocation of the inalienability of records. 
That is, respecting a government’s “inalienable” right to its own records arguably 
should encompass respecting its right to restrict access to them or even to 
destroy them. That would mean not only returning the original Iraqi records to 
Iraq, but also not making copies of them accessible and allowing the Iraqi 
112 General Records Schedule, “Seized German Records,” 2. Bradsher, “A ‘Constantly Recurring Irritant,’” 
180.
113 General Records Schedule, “Seized German Records,” 2.
114 SAA/ACA, “SAA/ACA Joint Statement on Iraqi Records.”
115 Francis L. Loewenheim, “Guides to Microfilmed German Records: A Review,” American Archivist 22 
(1959): 445. See also Fritz Epstein, “Washington Research Opportunities in the Period of World War 
II,” American Archivist 17 (1954): 225–36. Researchers were advised in 1959 that this “wealth of docu-
mentation will be available on microfilm, which scholars can either use in the National Archives or 
purchase for reading in the comfort of their own libraries.” Dagmar Horna Perman, “Microfilming of 
German Records in the National Archives,” American Archivist 22 (1959): 433–43.
116 See Astrid M. Eckert, “. . . And Grant German and Foreign Scholars Access at All Times”: Archival 
Access in West Germany during the Cold War,” in Political Pressure and the Archival Record, 75–91.
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government to determine their fate and the nature and extent of domestic and 
international access. 
Records seized by U.S. forces in Grenada in 1983 during Operation Urgent 
Fury perhaps provide a comparable example. Following the seizure, the SAA 
approved a resolution noting “with grave concern the fate of Grenadian 
Government and other cultural records as a consequence of the invasion of 
Grenada” and urging “their prompt return with decent regard for their prove-
nance and integrity.”117 The government of Grenada itself not only asked for the 
return of the documents, but also reportedly requested from the United States 
“an end to all further publication of the ‘captured documents.’ ”118 Instead, after 
returning the originals to Grenada, microfilmed copies made by the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) were made available to researchers at the National 
Archives. 
Strictly honoring national interests by not making accessible copies of 
records captured in armed conflict would foreclose one of the few ancillary 
international “benefits” resulting from the evils of war—the emancipation of 
records of nations that would otherwise be concealed from view. That is, war can 
sometimes assist in the accomplishment, albeit partial and involuntary, of Solon 
Buck’s vision of nations exchanging copies of their archival records to advance 
historical knowledge.119 
Further, in theory, providing broad international access to copies of seized 
records, assuming the nation from which they were obtained shares in that 
access, should also effectively make disputes over the return of the originals less 
important, if not moot.120 This does not appear, however, to be the case. As 
Patricia Kennedy Grimsted noted in 1995, the archives from Smolensk, Russia, 
that were in U.S. custody and were the subject of a continuing, and at times 
heated, debate, had “long been available in their entirety for public purchase 
on microfilm.”121
The Grenada records also provide a concrete example of the preservation 
benefits of retaining copies. While the location and current status of the original 
117 SAA Council Meeting, minutes, 2 September 1984, reprinted in American Archivist 48 (1985): 248–49.
118 “Grenada Wants Files,” Globe and Mail, 7 March 1984.
119 Buck, “The Archivist’s ‘One World,’” 17.
120 Obviously, original records can sometimes provide information that copies cannot. In 1959, Dagmar 
Perman, for example, lamented the “unfortunate fact” that some of the information “important to the 
scholar” contained within captured German records was “lost in the reproduction on microfilm” that 
the United States retained. “An outstanding example is color. It was generally the habit of many 
German officials of higher rank to stick generally to one color in their penciled notations. It is easy to 
identify them by their brilliant greens (Himmler), vermilions (Keitel), browns (Jodl), or purples 
(Thomas).” Perman, “Microfilming of German Records in the National Archives,” 433–43.
121 Grimsted, Smolensk, 4.
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records returned to Grenada appear uncertain,122 the microfilm copies made by 
the DIA remain available to researchers in Record Group 242 at the National 
Archives. The possible fate and long-term accessibility of other seized records 
are less comforting. 
The 160,000 pages of documents seized by U.S. forces in Haiti in 1994, for 
example, were reportedly initially sent back to the secure custody of DIA head-
quarters.123 After several years of controversy surrounding the return of the 
documents, including letters from dozens of members of Congress urging 
President Clinton to return them, the original documents were finally returned 
to Haiti in 2001.124 The current location and status of the originals are unclear. 
A human rights attorney who sought access to them after their return to Haiti 
fears that the documents were likely destroyed during the 2004 coup.125 
Moreover, a defense official has recently confirmed to the author that the DIA 
has no copies or scans of the returned original documents.126
The fate of documents seized during Operation Just Cause in Panama in 
1989 is similarly complex. As mentioned earlier, the DOD, with NARA endorse-
ment, treated the original documents as property of Panama. In 1993, however, 
when the United States offered the originals to Panama, the president of Panama 
reportedly said he would “not seek to recover” them and the Panamanian gov-
ernment reportedly wanted to destroy some of the files.127 Copies of seized doc-
uments, however, were distributed by the DIA to an “Inter-Agency Panama 
Document Review Group.” The State Department, one of the participating 
agencies, submitted a proposed records schedule in relation to its copies, which 
were determined to be “nonrecord.” The proposed schedule indicates that the 
DIA possessed the “master copy” of the documents.128 A defense official has 
confirmed to the author, however, that the DIA no longer has any copies of 
documents from Panama.129 While there is hope that copies of the Haitian and 
122 One researcher notes that the returned original Grenadian documents had been rumored to have 
once been housed at “Police Headquarters,” but that the “location, condition and accession of the 
original Grenada Documents remains obscured.” See “The Grenada Documents,” http://www.thegre-
nadarevolutiononline.com/grenadadocs.html, accessed 30 June 2011.
123 Phillipe R. Girard, Clinton in Haiti: The 1994 Invasion of Haiti (New York: Palgrave, 2004), 210. Girard, 
a historian, attempted unsuccessfully to gain access to the records via the Freedom of Information 
Act.
124 142 Cong. Rec. 12,513-14 (1996). Girard, Clinton in Haiti, 210.
125 Brian Concannon, Jr., director, Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, email to author, 26 January 
2011. A written request by the author for information from the Embassy of Haiti went unanswered.
126 Defense Intelligence Agency, email message to author, 3 March 2011.
127 See Andres Oppenheimer, “Political Hot Potato Sits in Panama Warehouse,” Miami Herald, 17 January 
1993.
128 Request for Records Disposition Authority, SF 115, Job. No. N1-59-94-18, 29 March 1994, http://www.
archives.gov/records-mgmt/rcs/schedules/departments/department-of-state/rg-0059/n1-059-94-
018_sf115.pdf, accessed 30 June 2011.
129 DIA to author, 3 March 2011. 
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Panamanian130 documents may exist in the custody of another federal agency or 
that the original records are safely at rest in archives in their respective coun-
tries, their fate appears to be in some doubt. 
The fate of the original Iraqi records seized by U.S. forces in Operation 
Desert Storm during the first Gulf War in 1991 is, however, confirmed. As men-
tioned above, the DIA submitted a records schedule covering the originals that 
was approved by the Archivist of the United States in August 2002. The schedule 
provided, however, that the original records were to be destroyed “upon the 
approval of this schedule.”131 NARA’s own copy of the schedule has blacked-out 
portions, but the Federal Register, which provided notice for the proposed sched-
ule, reveals that the original records had become “contaminated with mold.”132 
The DIA does, however, maintain scanned copies of the records. 
Such cautionary tales further support the argument for balancing national 
interests in the return of original records with international interests in long-
term preservation. Such situations might also argue for devoting greater 
efforts—perhaps comparable to those spent advocating for the return of origi-
nals—to ensuring that both copies and originals are properly preserved by U.S. 
federal agencies tasked with administering them, a goal that is modest, attain-
able, and within the special expertise of the archival community. 
Finally, given the importance of the eventual return of captured records for 
purposes of history, national reconciliation, and human rights, consideration 
should perhaps be given to exploring whether professional and practical oppor-
tunities exist for speeding their return. The return of seized records to Germany, 
for example, was advanced by “a rather unusual partnership” between the 
American Historical Association (AHA) and the Department of the Army.133 
The American Committee for the Study of War Documents, which became an 
AHA committee, worked closely with the National Archives and the military in 
not only microfilming the captured German records, but organizing and cata-
loging them.134 This partnership undoubtedly accelerated the return of records 
130 As this article was in the final stages of editing, a defense official confirmed to the author that the U.S. 
Army in fact has custody of “a large volume” of at least some of the “documents/records from the 
Noreiga Regime, which were ‘captured’ during Operation Just Cause” in Panama. U.S. Southern 
Command, email message to author, 31 August 2011. The author thanks Trudy Huskamp Peterson, 
Stephen Lucas, Andres Ortegon, LTC Thomas Veale, and Lisa Roberson for their assistance in the 
lengthy search for the fate of the Panama documents.
131 Request for Records Disposition Authority, SF 115, Job. No. N1-373-02-3, approved 9 August 2002.
132 67 Fed. Reg. 40,343 (12 June 2002). A defense official confirmed to the author that the documents 
referenced in the schedule “were the originals and were destroyed because of contamination.” DIA to 
author, 3 March 2011.
133 Pomerenze, “Policies and Procedures for the Protection, Use, and Return of Captured German 
Records,” 29.
134 See Herman G. Goldbeck, “The German Military Documents Section and the Captured Records 
Section,” in Captured German and Related Records, ed. Robert Wolfe, 50–57 (Athens: University of Ohio 
Press, 1974). See also Perman, “Microfilming of German Records in the National Archives,” 433–43.
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to Germany while preserving the captured documents “for the future use of 
scholarship and military intelligence.”135 
While records seized from Iraq may have already been digitized within the 
“Harmony” intelligence database, as of 2006, less than 15 percent of them had 
even been fully translated.136 The ill-advised effort by the director of National 
Intelligence in 2006 to upload untranslated captured records onto the Internet 
arose, in part, because the “sheer volume of documents” had “overwhelmed the 
intelligence community.”137 Likewise, DOD’s Minerva Research Initiative, which 
included the “Iraqi Perspectives Project,” gave preference to “studies that exploit 
materials that have not been previously translated.”138 Although Saad Eskander 
validly complained about the United States making Iraqi records available to 
selected university researchers, while denying access to Iraqis, to whom those 
records are most important, such efforts by the DOD may also be viewed as a cry 
for help in processing the documents.139 Recently, the new Conflict Records 
Research Center at the National Defense University began making a small but 
growing number of captured records from both Iraq and Afghanistan available 
to researchers, regardless of citizenship, subject to certain restrictions designed 
to protect personal information contained in some of the records. The center 
cites as its “genesis” a speech by Defense Secretary Robert Gates who compared 
the collection to the Smolensk archives and states, “We cannot realize the full 
value of these resources unless we find some way of making them widely 
available.”140 
The practical reality remains that, just as in the processing of German 
records in the 1950s, the records will not be “widely available,” and the originals 
will not be returned absent the U.S. government sufficiently examining their 
content to protect national interests. Whether the archival, historical, or human 
rights communities could form a partnership to accelerate that goal for inter-
national purposes is uncertain. A defense analyst’s description of visiting a mili-
tary facility in Qatar where the original Iraqi records at the center of the contro-
versy are housed may provide a final motivation to consider all possibilities: 
“Upon entering the main warehouse,” he describes,
135 Goldbeck, “The German Military Documents Section and the Captured Records Section,” 55.
136 Institute for Defense Analysis, Iraq Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from 
Captured Iraqi Documents (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses 2007), v.
137 Broad, “U.S. Web Archive Is Said to Reveal Nuclear Primer,” A1. 
138 Department of Defense, U.S. Army Research Office, “Broad Agency Announcement No. W911NF-
08-R-0007,” 19, http://www.arl.army.mil/www/pages/362/08-R-0007.pdf, accessed 30 June 2011.
139 Saad Eskander, “Minerva Research Initiative, Searching for the Truth or Denying the Iraqis the Rights 
to Know the Truth?,” The Social Science Research Council, “The Minerva Controversy,” http://essays.
ssrc.org/minerva/2008/10/29/eskander/, accessed 30 June 2011.
140 Conflict Records Research Center, “Frequently Asked Questions,” Institute for National Strategic 
Studies at the National Defense University, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/index.cfm?secID=143&pageID
=4&type=section, accessed 1 June 2011.
481
N at i o N a l  a r c h i v e s  a N d  i N t e r N at i o N a l  c o N f l i c t s :  t h e  s o c i e t y  o f  a m e r i c a N  a r c h i v i s t s  a N d  W a r
the team confronted a scene reminiscent of the end of the Steven Spielberg 
movie Indiana Jones and the Raiders of the Lost Ark. After recovering the lost Ark 
of the Covenant from the Nazis, the audience watches archivists box it up and 
slowly wheel it into an anonymous U.S. Government warehouse already filled 
with similar boxes, presumably only to be lost again.141
C o n c l u s i o n
Controversies over the fate of archives in war, as both current and past 
examples abundantly illustrate, can quickly become heated with accusations of 
malicious intentions and illegality. The passions inspired reflect the importance 
of the issues, but they do not necessarily advance the cause. The particularly 
fierce rhetoric in the still-ongoing debate over the Iraqi records—which includes 
the SAA/ACA’s suggestion of “pillage” in relation to the Iraqi records now at the 
Hoover Institution—has done little to bring a solution and has unnecessarily 
turned archivists against each other. 
As this article attempts to illustrate, archivists in war occupy an unenviable 
position at the crux of the conflict between national and international interests 
in archives. They must walk the razor’s edge between neutral protectors of cul-
tural property and combatants conscripted by the nature of the records in their 
care. They face sometimes impossible choices and are forced to take actions that 
could be alternatively characterized as heroic or treasonous. 
The complex issues of archives and archivists in war need a renewed debate 
within the archival community, one that questions old assumptions and consid-
ers new strategies. That debate, however, should be as respectful as it is vigorous 
and should take the high road the occasion requires. 
141 Kevin M. Woods, et al., Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior 
Leadership, 184, http://merln.ndu.edu/archive/DigitalCollections/IraqiPerspectivesProject.pdf, 
accessed 1 June 2011.
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